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In their think-piece, Michael Carter and Chris Barrett
provide an intuitive overview of their recent joint
work on asset thresholds and poverty traps. At its
core is a model in which there is a critical threshold
in the space of assets, below which no escape from
poverty is possible, except via some outside shock or
intervention. To avoid people sliding into this trap,
social protection in the form of transfers needs to be
offered, with substantial social returns, over and
above a simple ‘humanitarian’ model that targets the
poorest, but that does not offer protection against
(re)lapses into poverty, or support to transcend the
threshold.
Their work has to be seen as a careful and valuable
contribution in the context of a far too small field
within economics of researchers concerned with
developing positive theories of poverty: how poverty is
produced and reproduced. By explicitly introducing
insurance and credit market failures, as well as assets
thresholds, poverty is not just a self-evident problem
of ‘low endowments’: we need to think carefully
about how poverty is shaped by the particular ways in
which market failures and thresholds interact. This
understanding is crucial for appropriate policy design:
as their discussion shows, policies are not ‘self-evident’
either – just giving transfers to the poorest is not
necessarily the most effective poverty-reducing policy.
In an age of naïve belief in targeted cash transfers,
whether conditional or unconditional, this type of
analysis is timely and essential to guard us against yet
another disappointment in the search for the quick fix
in development and social protection problems.
I am nevertheless concerned that Carter and
Barrett’s contribution is somehow too narrow in
focus. First, it is narrow in terms of its diagnosis of
the problems of poverty traps and risk. Second, it is
narrow in terms of the policy implications and
solutions it proposes, even within the confines of
their model. At the same time, it overstates the
relevance of their specific asset threshold model and
the available evidence.
I am convinced that asset thresholds are a reality in
particular contexts. Despite many suggestions to the
contrary, these traps are not easily detected and the
empirical evidence is, in my experience, at best,
shaky. I can be persuaded that the pastoralist
livestock economy, the setting of their best known
example, has ‘natural’ herd size-related multiple
equilibria, that are relatively homogenous across
farmers – so the estimation problems are not as
critical. However, in other settings, people hold a
variety of assets and engage in a variety of activities.
Thresholds are most easily understood as a form of
binding entry constraints – a process of exclusion. A
pastoralist without access to credit may not be able
to get a minimal herd size to allow a natural
accumulation process to result in a ‘high income’
equilibrium. But most other families face a broader
set of options, each with their own entry problems,
and as a consequence, potentially a multitude of
thresholds defined in different assets and activities:
for example, a minimum level of financial assets
needed to buy oxen, no scope for acquiring more
land from the community because of land scarcity,
missing the minimum qualification to apply for a local
white collar job, lacking the connections to get onto
a food-for-work programme, being of the wrong
caste to use irrigation canals, living in a slum with too
much petty crime to be able to set up a kiosk
without facing extortion, or gender-based social
norms that keep girls out of education.
A key weakness in the asset threshold framework, at
least in its empirical practice, is that it is uni-
dimensional: the threshold is defined in terms of the
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value of assets, as if all these possible dimensions of
assets can be aggregated, and even more
importantly, as if the underlying poverty trap is
essentially driven by the failure to get credit to climb
over the threshold. Credit market failures are
definitely important, but, as the examples above
illustrate, both institutional and market failures –
including problems with land rights, caste structure,
crime and insecurity, corruption, public good
provision, and social exclusion – may induce threshold
effects that are not easily reduced to lack of financial
capital. Each of these conditions could give rise to
poverty traps, not dissimilar to the models described
above, but often with radically different implications
for social protection policies. Furthermore,
thresholds or barriers into particular activities may be
multi-dimensional themselves (e.g. gender-specific
credit market failures and other complementarities)
introducing important heterogeneity in their impact,
affecting both the empirical analysis as well as the
interpretation of any results. Arguably, this is an
empirical issue, and may justify taking the asset
threshold model to a variety of rural and urban
settings. However, as the evidence available from
most settings is at best controversial, and at worst,
largely non-existent, basing broad policy thinking on
it is likely to overshoot the target.
At the same time, models of poverty traps have
intuitively strong appeal, and the careful link they can
make between relevant market and institutional
failures and the production and reproduction of
poverty offers refreshing insights into thinking about
poverty and social protection policies. While giving
credit to the asset threshold framework, one should
therefore also pay more attention to a broader (if
often rather inaccessible) theoretical and empirical
literature on poverty traps that has acknowledged
this variety of mechanisms – reviews are provided in
Bowles et al. (2006) or Dercon (2004).
The policy implications of asset thresholds and other
poverty trap models are striking and should not be
understated. As Carter and Barrett make clear, when
budgets are restricted, just focusing on the poor may
not work well as a policy to reduce or keep poverty
low when ‘random’ shocks such as droughts occur,
even if some people are in the low-income trap to
start with. The reason is that these are equilibrium
models: poverty is a low-income equilibrium with
forces that keep pushing people back into it, even if
they start moving away. It is easy to drift into poverty
(by falling below the threshold, as if down a cliff) but
hard (and more costly) to climb out of the ravine. As
a result, if only limited funds are available, some
money can be better spent to keep a substantial
number of people from falling below the threshold
to join the pool of chronic poor, rather than giving a
sufficiently large sum to a small group of people in
the low-income equilibrium that would allow them
to jump across the threshold. This view is consistent
with social protection as a safety net for the
currently not-so-poor, but it has a serious rationale if
we are concerned with keeping overall chronic
poverty low in the long run.
Of course, for many it is not satisfactory to write off
the current chronic poor, and donors and NGOs
have designed many programmes, such as conditional
or unconditional cash transfer programmes (the
flavour of the month right now) to target these
groups. Carter and Barrett’s article should not make
happy reading for them. In most cases, the
programmes involve giving specific transfers in cash
to the poorest, possibly conditional on other actions
by the families, such as sending children to school.
Mostly, the transfers are significant but small. In a
world without poverty traps, this would make sense:
we offer regular additional resources, and allow
people to use them as they wish to build a better
life. ‘Chronic’ poverty will be gradually reduced. The
key problem, if asset poverty traps exist, is that
regular small transfers have zero impact in terms of
chronic poverty: after receiving the transfer, income
is briefly increased, but people slip quickly back to
the earlier equilibrium. Only if the transfers are large
enough to lift the chronically poor person above the
threshold can the person start moving towards a
high-income equilibrium. With a limited chronic
poverty reduction budget, one should therefore
instead, give large transfers to a few, and not small
transfers targeted, with perfect inclusion, to all the
chronic poor. ‘Small is not beautiful’ – it is useless for
the poor.
If one is concerned with reaching all of the poor,
then we need very large transfers, large enough to
take the poor past the thresholds. This is not
redistribution or social protection as is usually
politically feasible: this is a revolution. Finding
revolution as the only plausible solution may well
appeal to my (and no doubt, many readers’) old
Marxist roots, but it is not credible as policy advice.
Not because revolution is not possible, but because
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the model can then not predict its outcome: the
impact of really large transfers, or ‘revolution’, is
hardly plausibly analysed in a comparative static partial
equilibrium framework: we need to start thinking
about the ‘general equilibrium effects’ as well.
Are these striking policy recommendations confined
to the asset poverty trap model? Not at all: similar
findings can be derived from many other poverty trap
models in a world in which shocks occur. Small
interventions do not have any impact, and the return
in terms of overall poverty from using limited
budgets to keep people from falling into the trap is
higher than from using the same budget on people
already in the trap. There is nevertheless a key
difference: many plausible poverty traps need to be
resolved using coordinated actions to have any
impact; even large sums spent on individuals in
poverty traps may not have any impact. For example,
suppose social norms and structures (e.g. gender,
caste or ethnicity-based exclusion) are excluding
some from entering particular activities or from living
in particular areas, then no amount of money spent
on one person in the trap will lift her out: it is
essential to coordinate the intervention to focus on
whole groups, structures or areas to have any impact,
making the task obviously even tougher. As discussed
in Dercon (2004), geography, remoteness or even
just living together with a lot of poor people, such as
in slums, may induce similar traps, with the
externalities from living with other poor people
creating processes that trap people forever in
poverty, with limited impact via any targeted actions
on specific individuals in the group or area. In these
circumstances, the focus in the asset poverty trap
framework on returns from spending on individuals
may be misleading.
Still, one of the most important insights of the
Carter and Barrett analysis is to attribute a relatively
high return to social protection in the form of safety
nets to prevent people sliding down the slippery
slope. However, this is somewhat misleading as well,
as it leads to a dual view of social protection
targeted to different groups. First, is social protection
as traditional social insurance, which matters for the
‘middle group’ of people who are not quite poor but
face some risk of ruin, so that vulnerability is viewed
as the risk of becoming poor. Second is social
protection as either chronic poverty policy or a form
of ‘transformative social protection’, focusing on the
already poor. This is misleading because risk is not
well dealt with: risk only appears as ‘shocks’, and as a
result, negative shocks are really only relevant for
those at risk of falling below the threshold. While in
other work, Carter and Barrett have incorporated
this to some extent, its policy implications are
important as well.
If risk is present (in the sense that something bad
may happen), then asset accumulation processes
involve the possibility of serious drawbacks. In the
model, it would mean that people may not choose
to use any assets they have or receive as part of a
transfer programme as productively as possible,
because they may end up even worse off than
before. They may hold on to the poor situation they
are in now, rather than risk ending up in an even
more disastrous state of destitution if the ‘gamble’ of
accumulation fails. They may do this despite the fact
that in ‘normal’ circumstances, productive use of the
asset would lift them above the threshold. Risk
would then mean that some would ‘choose’ to
remain poor – it keeps them trapped in poverty. In
such a world, risk causes chronic poverty, not via
shocks, but because it stops people from trying to
get out. Offering forms of protection to ensure that
the poor do not slide even further is then essential
as part of ‘chronic’ poverty policy – and not just for
those above the poverty threshold, as may have been
unintentionally implied by the stylised discussion of
policy choices by the Carter and Barrett article.
Safety nets and social insurance do not matter just
for the middle classes in poor societies, and are as
such, not a luxury.
But are we considering the policy options carefully
enough? Asset thresholds matter and cause poverty
traps because capital matters for escaping poverty,
and credit markets exclude the poor. The view
behind this is that poor people must accumulate
capital via farm, off-farm business or urban informal
sector activities to escape poverty. We could then
make credit markets work better – as microfinance
programmes encourage – or we could offer transfers
as a substitute for credit and insurance markets – as
social protection policies may do, as discussed above.
But are we then considering the best option? Maybe
what we need to do is to make asset thresholds
matter less to escape poverty, by making capital
accumulation less relevant for escaping poverty.
Recent history has taught us that this is how large
numbers of the poor have escaped their deep
deprivation: by moving out of agriculture and
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informal activities, where they need capital to move
forward, to activities that only involve selling their
labour in a context of labour-intensive economic
growth.
Of course, this may be a bumpy road, with ample
scope for social protection interventions, but it
makes asset poverty traps irrelevant for the poor, as
it offers opportunities that are not dependent on
household-specific accumulation. Although I will stay
shy of advocating that promoting growth is the best
social protection policy, it may well be that creating
opportunities in activities that are less dependent on
thresholds and stimulating the unravelling of
thresholds, including via growth, may well be the
social protection policies that will prove to be most
effective in transforming the lives of the poor.
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